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These views did not help Dr Codman's career. He quit his position as a staff surgeon at the Massachusetts General Hospital to protest the hospital administration's refusal to measure and disclose outcomes and was later forced to resign as chairman of the Suffolk District Surgical Society. 2 Two weeks after his death in 1940, the hospital's trustees passed a resolution calling him a "champion of truth" who was "willing to sacrifice personal place and standing to achieve what he believed to be right." 2 In poor financial circumstances, he was buried initially without a headstone. In 2014, Dr Andrew L. Warshaw, the surgeon-in-chief emeritus and a former president of the New England Surgical Society, organized a granite and bronze memorial for Dr Codman's gravesite in Cambridge, MA. 2 More than 7 decades after Dr Codman's death, debate persists about how to measure and report outcomes in medicine. Although the concept of measuring outcomes is now firmly embraced, risk-adjustment methods, the dissemination of outcomes data, and the incentives for healthcare providers and healthcare systems to improve outcomes remain contested. Cardiologists and cardiac surgeons have been among the first physicians to grapple with these issues, largely because cardiac disease is appealing for outcomes measurement and reporting. Not only is cardiac disease the leading cause of death in the United States, accounting for nearly one-fifth of healthcare spending, 3 but the cardiovascular community has led the way in evidence-based guidelines that lend themselves to quality measurement. Globally, ischemic heart disease and stroke have become the top 2 causes of death. 4 The notion that the public and payers have the right to access comparative outcomes data has strong face validity and strong public support. Public reporting of outcomes data may encourage hospitals and providers to improve care and to reduce costs.
Nevertheless, legitimate concerns persist about unintended consequences. Specifically, public reporting may encourage physicians and hospitals to exaggerate the severity of illness of their patients and avoid high-risk patients who may benefit the most from treatment. Inadequate risk adjustment may lead to inaccurate designations of providers as high or low quality. In addition, publicly reported data are often complex and present challenges for proper interpretation. Successful public reporting will require optimizing data collection, risk adjustment, and data presentation so as to avoid these unintended consequences. Adding incentive-based payments to public reporting may promote further care improvement but also raises concerns about exacerbating the adverse consequences of public reporting, particularly with vulnerable populations.
In this article, we review the history of public reporting for cardiac care in the United States, discuss the ethical basis for public reporting, review how public reporting affects different stakeholders, discuss how consumers use publicly reported data, provide examples of quality improvements associated with public reporting, discuss validity concerns about publicly reported data, and highlight unintended consequences. Finally, we propose recommendations for improving the accuracy, validity, and meaningfulness to patients of publicly reported data for cardiac conditions.
History of Public Reporting in Cardiology and Cardiac Surgery in the United States
The modern era of public reporting in heart disease began in 1989. The New York State Department of Health began collecting data on surgeon-specific mortality rates after coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG). Although these data were not meant for public disclosure, the Long Island newspaper Newsday filed a Freedom of Information Act request to obtain access to the data and published surgeon-specific mortality rates on December 18, 1991. 5 In 1995, New York began collecting cardiologist-specific mortality data for percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) and reported them publicly in 1996. 6 In 1994, the Pennsylvania Health Care
The Massachusetts State legislature passed legislation in 2000 establishing the Massachusetts Data Analysis Center, with data collection starting in 2002 for cardiac surgery and in 2003 for PCI. 9 California started the mandatory public reporting of cardiac surgery outcomes in 2003. 10 In addition to statemandated public reporting, CABG mortality rates through the Society of Thoracic Surgeons has been publicly disclosed for hundreds of hospitals. 11 The American College of Cardiology National Cardiovascular Data Registry CathPCI registry collects data on aspirin, P2Y 12 inhibitor, and statin prescriptions at hospital discharge and in-hospital risk-adjusted mortality rates after PCI. Unlike the Society of Thoracic Surgeons registry, the CathPCI data are not subject to public reporting, and primarily measured at the hospital rather than the individual physician level. 12 This data collection at the hospital unit provides aggregate data with large enough numbers to be statistically reliable and focuses on actionable data at the organizational level where quality improvement initiatives most commonly occur. 13 The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) have also publicly disclosed quality metrics for Medicare patients. Many of those quality metrics involve cardiovascular conditions. In particular, the CMS Hospital Compare Web site includes hospital rates of 8 process measures for AMI hospitalizations, 3 process measures for congestive heart failure (CHF) hospitalizations, 10 process measures for stroke hospitalizations, and 5 process measures for the prevention and treatment of venous thromboembolism.
14 Additionally, Hospital Compare reports 30-day risk-adjusted readmission and mortality rates for both AMI and CHF. 14 Increasingly, publicly reported quality-of-care metrics affect hospital reimbursement. In 2016, the CMS Hospital Value-Based Purchasing program will include payment adjustments based on several chart-abstracted clinical process of care measures such as evaluation of left ventricular systolic dysfunction for patients with heart failure admissions and glucose control for patients after cardiac surgery. 15 Other measures such as timing of administration of fibrinolytics or primary PCI for ST-segment-elevation myocardial infarction are being taken out of the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing program because hospitals have improved such that statistically meaningful distinctions between hospitals have become difficult. 16 Since October 2012, the CMS Hospital Readmission-Reduction Program has withheld a proportion of Medicare payments from hospitals with high risk-adjusted readmission rates for patients with AMI, CHF, and pneumonia. 17 Some contracts between provider organizations and private insurance companies adjust payments on the basis of quality metrics, including cholesterol goals for outpatients with coronary disease and discharge medications for patients hospitalized for CHF and AMI. 18 Publicly reported quality data in cardiovascular care are managed by different organizations, with many overlapping and redundant measures. A full list appears in Table I in the onlineonly Data Supplement.
Ethical and Practical Basis for Public Disclosure
At first glance, public reporting makes sense. Just as consumers integrate quality information to inform purchasing decisions for many goods and services, payers and patients who pick providers and consume medical services should have access to information about their decisions. Public disclosure also has compelling practical rationale. The ability of healthcare consumers to access outcomes data may pressure providers to accelerate improvement. For example, a 1992 statute mandates the public reporting of birth outcomes for centers that perform in vitro fertilization. 19 Some have attributed the extraordinary improvement in rates of success with in vitro fertilization to the scrutiny of public reporting. 20 Both payers and policy experts have embraced public reporting as a potential strategy to improve the quality of care that payers purchase. [21] [22] [23] Despite the compelling face validity and promise of improvement, public enthusiasm for reported data has been lukewarm. The public does not generally appear to change decisions about how or where to seek care on the basis of public reporting, 24 and poorly constructed displays of publicly reported data for cardiac surgery have led to limited understanding of results. 25 Others have found that public reporting is more likely to generate quality improvement when high and low performers are clearly designated.
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Stakeholders
Public disclosure affects multiple stakeholders: patients, employers/purchasers, health plans, providers, and policy makers. 27 Patients receive information that potentially will influence their decisions about health care. Purchasers and employers receive information that could influence decisions about contracting with health plans, and health plans receive information that could influence decisions about networks and copayments. Providers receive feedback about their performance that could be an opportunity for quality improvement, and public disclosure could affect patient perception of provider quality.
In addition to these stakeholders directly affected, public reporting affects other constituencies indirectly. For example, because of risk aversion and case selection bias, public reporting for cardiac surgeons may affect interventional cardiologists, and public reporting for cardiac surgeons in one state may affect cardiac surgeons in an adjacent state. These effects can be quite significant. For example, surgical noncandidacy is a predictor of mortality for unprotected left main or multivessel PCI, 28, 29 and public reporting of CABG mortality in New York State resulted in sicker patients from New York being referred to the Cleveland Clinic (Figure 1) . 30 Thus, public reporting affects not only the providers subject to reporting but also providers in nearby locations or related fields who may not themselves be subject to reporting.
with that principle, some evidence exists that implies that public reporting intensifies quality improvement activity in provider organizations. 31 Despite the proliferation of public quality metrics, however, there is limited evidence showing that patients act on quality metrics in ways that ultimately improve care. 24, 32 Survey results published in 1997 suggested that in the early phase of surgeon-specific public reporting for CABG mortality in New York, a majority of cardiologists said that the publicly reported information did not change their referral patterns to surgeons. 33 Even in 2011, when 94% of cardiologists in New York were aware of the information, 57% still thought the ratings were not important or minimally important. 34 Even if patients use public reporting information, understanding of the data can be limited, 35 and patients are more interested in provider-level data than the typically reported practice group-or hospital-level information. 36 These factors have kept public reporting from reaching its potential and have not stopped the use of quality data for punitive purposes. For example, the lay press labeling of some hospitals in Massachusetts as "negative outliers" has had serious financial consequences for those institutions and provoked costly quality review assessments by neutral agencies.
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Public Reporting Improving Care
Despite the challenges, public reporting has coincided with some notable quality improvement successes. In 1992, Congress passed the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, which mandated national public reporting of outcomes for assisted reproductive technology. 38 Since then, outcomes nationally have improved substantially. From 2000 to 2010, the rate of good perinatal outcomes in the United States (a single live-born infant delivered after 37 weeks of gestation weighing ≥2500 g) increased from 18.5% to 26.7% of all donor oocyte cycles. 39 All-cause readmission among Medicare patients declined by 8% after Medicare began public reporting of readmission rates in 2009 followed by financial penalties for hospitals with higher-than-expected readmission rates. 40 In cardiac care, the initial cardiac surgery public reporting in New York coincided with a mortality decrease from 3.52% in 1989 to 2.45% in 1992, despite higher case complexity and predicted mortality. 41 In California, CABG public reporting coincided with a reduction in riskadjusted mortality from 3.00% in 2003 to 1.92% in 2007. 42 In Minnesota, where aspirin prophylaxis is publicly reported, 95% of patients with vascular disease receive aspirin, higher than the 35% to 47% of patients nationally. 27, 43 Such claims of process improvement, however, are fraught with questions of data collection. For example, because aspirin is often purchased over the counter, aspirin use is often incompletely captured in electronic health records and clinical registries. Therefore, claims of outcome improvement are often more convincing than claims of process improvement in response to public reporting. Although these examples provide strong suggestive evidence of the positive impact of public reporting, it is difficult to control for confounding factors that may have also contributed the observed improvements in quality.
Concerns About the Validity of Publicly Reported Data
Public reporting is only meaningful if, after risk adjustment, remaining differences in process measures or outcomes between hospitals, practice groups, or physicians are related to differences in the quality of care delivered. The 2008 American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association guidelines on performance metrics and quality measures defines quality metrics as "measures that have been developed to support self-assessment and quality improvement at the provider, hospital, or healthcare system level." 44 Performance metrics, more specifically, are selected quality metrics "with attributes rendering them suitable for public reporting and for explicit comparisons of care between institutions or healthcare providers." 44 Although quality metrics may be suitable for internal quality improvement, performance metrics are specifically appropriate for "public reporting or other forms of accountability." Therefore, performance metrics imply appropriateness for judgment about quality. Several potential threats to validity exist for this assumption. First, observational data, even when adjusted for case characteristics, are subject to confounding. [45] [46] [47] Consider Hospital A, renowned for taking the toughest cases for CABG surgery, and Hospital B, which routinely transfers the hardest cases to Hospital A. Raw mortality statistics for the 2 hospitals would clearly be uninformative in assessing relative quality. However, even after adjustment for known predictors of mortality such as age and diabetes mellitus status, unmeasured differences between the case mix at the 2 hospitals could still pose a threat to validity for adjusted results. The problem is that the decision to transfer a patient to Hospital A is a treatment decision that differentiates between sicker and less sick patients. Often, statistical models can be improved by sequentially adding variables that mediate a clinician's perception of increased risk. Nevertheless, many of those variables that influence clinician's perception such as frailty 48 are not well captured in electronic health records or structured data and therefore are challenging to add to risk models. 49 This theoretical concern about unmeasured difference in hospital case mix may in fact have confounded reporting of outlier hospitals. In Massachusetts, all 4 hospitals marked as negative outliers were tertiary referral centers, which often accept complex transfers from other facilities. 50 In at least 1 case, an independent site review determined that negative outlier status was not related to poor quality of care. 51 Because of the limitations of modeling, residual difference in risk-adjusted outcomes between providers or institutions may not reflect differences in quality.
In addition to concerns about inadequate risk adjustment, questions remain about risk models derived from claims data. As a result of the time-and resource-intensive nature of medical record review, risk models based on administrative claims are easier to implement than models based on clinical registries or medical review. Claims-based models, however, are not necessarily as accurate as clinical registries. 52, 53 In other cases, claims-based models have been validated against models derived from medical record review. [54] [55] [56] Claims-based models are more credible when they are validated with registry-based models. Validation, however, is a time-consuming process and may hamper public reporting.
Even if extraction of data from medical records or claims data produces accurate models, concerns persist that clinicians may manipulate, consciously or unconsciously, data to increase the apparent risk of their patients. In fact, a plurality of cardiac surgeons (40%) claimed that the manipulation of patient risk factors to exaggerate patient risk is the aspect of public reporting most in need of improvement. 57 There is evidence to corroborate this perception. In New York between 1989 and 1991, the incidence of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease among CABG patients "increased" from 6.9% to 17.4% and the incidence of CHF "increased" from 1.7% to 7.6%. 58 These dramatic changes in comorbidities may have been due to increased vigilance in documenting comorbidities more completely, exaggerating comorbidities, or both. Either would confound our ability to assess the effect of public reporting on risk-adjusted outcomes. This highlights the potential for different levels of manipulation among different providers, frustrating efforts to compare them. This process may also occur at the institutional level with greater or lesser investments in technology and human capital tasked specifically with data abstraction and adjudication. Intuitively, institutions that underresource the quality-reporting process are less likely to capture comprehensive and complete patient risk profiles.
Unintended Consequences of Public Reporting
Providers can improve their quality statistics by avoiding patients likely to have poor outcomes. With procedural public reporting, physicians could avoid patients more likely to die after the procedure. In outpatient care, this effect may cause clinicians or hospital systems to discourage high-risk patients from seeking care with them. Risk adjustment attenuates this effect because patients at risk for poor outcomes presumably will have risk markers accounted for in the riskadjusted results. However, many variables such as nonadherence, frailty, or psychiatric disease are not typically included in risk adjustment and may affect results. A provider could theoretically improve the adjusted outcome results by systematically excluding patients for whom expected risk exceeds model-predicted risk and systematically including patients for whom model-predicted risk exceeds expected risk. One of the many important reasons to develop accurate risk models is that accurate risk adjustment might lead to more confidence among providers in the models and perhaps less propensity for providers to perceive the need to engage in this type of manipulation.
How providers' assessment of actual risk differs from model-predicted risk is unclear and may vary with clinical setting and clinical issues. Providers' assessment can be more accurate than prediction models, 59 similar to prediction models, 60 or biased toward higher-than-predicted risk. 61 However, patient perception of actual risk often differs from modelpredicted risk. [62] [63] [64] If clinician-perceived risk also differs from model-predicted risk, the potential for systematic distortion in patient selection exists. Our hope is that clinicians' benevolence and fiduciary responsibilities toward patients drive them to always consider an individual patient's best interest. However, the introduction of public reporting and the use of these metrics to determine reimbursement have the potential to skew clinical decision making away from clinical judgment alone.
Unfortunately, empirical evidence exists to corroborate this theoretical possibility. In New York, 79% of interventional cardiologists claimed that public reporting had at times influenced their decision on whether to perform PCI. 65 In Massachusetts, when public reporting began, physicians appeared to avoid PCI in higher-risk AMI patients (Figure 2 ). In New York (a reporting state), the mortality after PCI was 0.83%, but in Michigan (a nonreporting state), the mortality after PCI was 1.54% in 1998 and 1999. 5 After risk adjustment, the odds ratios for death in New York and Michigan were similar, suggesting that fewer high-risk patients in New York received PCI, lowering the mortality rate. 5 With the introduction of public reporting in Massachusetts, patients undergoing PCI for cardiogenic shock declined from 2.28% of all cases in 2003 to 1.29% of all cases in 2005, 67 suggesting risk-averse behavior. Risk-averse behavior in PCI in Massachusetts was found to have intensified for those hospitals publicly identified as negative outliers 68 ( Figure 3 ). Most concerning, after the introduction of public reporting in Massachusetts and New York, fewer AMI patients received PCI, and overall mortality for AMI increased. 69 Furthermore, even when a public report accurately identifies a hospital or provider as a negative outlier, whether that report improves or further worsens care is uncertain. For example, critical access hospitals in rural areas perform worse on Hospital Quality Alliance process measures for AMI and CHF and have higher mortality rates for those conditions. 70 Safety net hospitals also perform poorly on measures of patient experience. 71 Black patients are more vulnerable to hospital readmission after AMI, CHF, and PCI. 72, 73 Public reporting in New York may have exacerbated racial disparities in access to care for CABG (Figure 4) . 74 Public reporting of worse results for hospitals that serve minorities, rural populations, and vulnerable populations may drive patients away from those hospitals or decrease reimbursement for care at such centers, worsening financial constraints that could exacerbate genuine quality problems at those institutions. In that sense, public reporting can act as a regressive measure, hurting patients who are already vulnerable and worsening the institutions that serve them.
Exclusion of Groups of Patients From Public Reporting
Because publicly reported quality data are often used to compare one institution to the next, reported quality data are often restricted to standardized populations within the total cohort treated per hospital. Standardized populations are intended to allow "apples to apples" comparisons between hospitals. For example, the CMS has not recorded all ST-segment-elevation myocardial infarction patients when evaluating door-to-balloon times in recognition that certain factors are outside the process or control of the institutions. 16 The omission of certain patients allows increased gaming and bias concerning who is excluded per institution 75 but also limits the disproportionate effects on aggregate data driven by small numbers of highly influential patients.
Because of the potential to abuse patient exemptions as a mechanism to artificially improve reported performance quality, this process has been particularly controversial in regard to risk-adjusted mortality outcomes after PCI. These outcomes are currently publicly published in 3 states, New York, Massachusetts, and Washington, and all 3 states have taken differing approaches to exemptions for high-risk populations, suggesting that there remains no consensus on how best to address this issue. In this case, New York excludes from public analysis any patient receiving PCI who meets certain prespecified criteria, whereas Massachusetts provides a risk-adjustment modifier after specific case adjudication, and Washington State does not currently exclude or further risk modify anyone. 16 Although the topic remains controversial, the American Heart Association has recently released a scientific statement suggesting that excluding certain critically ill populations from publicly reported risk-adjusted mortality after PCI is necessary to preserve access to care. 49 More broadly, the inclusion of only selected patients in all qualityreporting processes is founded on the notion that hospitals may serve fundamentally different populations from one another and that certain processes are driven by patient choice or other unavoidable factors for which individual hospitals should not be held responsible. Nevertheless, this selection process creates opportunities for "gaming the system" and has the potential to erode the face validity of the reported data.
Improving the Future of Public Reporting for Cardiac Care
The problems with public reporting for cardiac care are well documented. Risk aversion, gaming, perplexing metrics, inaccurate or incomplete information, and the administrative burden of reporting have detracted from public reporting. The implication that public reporting encourages providers to turn down patients at high risk provokes wrenching ethical dilemmas and may shift patients to other procedures or other hospitals. Nevertheless, we believe that despite all this, we are slowly moving toward a future in which the potential promise of public reporting will outweigh the adverse consequences, improving transparency and value for patients.
Shift From Procedures to Disease-Based Population Health
First, for pragmatic reasons, the early history of cardiac public reporting in the United States has focused primarily on cardiac procedures, often with mortality as a reported outcome. Reporting mortality statistics about procedures, however, creates awkward incentives for risk aversion. In contrast, reporting mortality statistics on large populations with coronary disease would be more meaningful because provider groups would have the incentive to improve quality without shifting high-risk patients toward or away from specific procedures or therapies. Moreover, quality improvement efforts are often undertaken by organizations such as hospitals or provider groups. Thus, population-level data become more actionable for these more aggregate groups and avoid the stigma associated with reporting on an individual physician. Furthermore, procedural registries lack a true "denominator" population because those turned down for the procedure in question are absent. Focusing on disease-specific registries or comprehensive populations, on the other hand, may reduce procedural risk aversion for high-risk patients when such procedures are indicated. Although public reporting exists for AMI, regardless of whether a procedure was performed, public reporting is rare for populations with stable coronary disease.
We recognize the substantial logistical challenges of population-based outcomes reporting. Discrete procedures have features that are easier to report and commonly captured by both registries and claims. Procedures are discrete events with measurable, objective outcomes, including mortality. We favor a gradual shift to disease-and population-based outcomes replacing procedural outcomes reporting. Although disease-based outcomes reporting occurs for AMI and CHF admissions among Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries, it is not comprehensive, nor is it able to offset the risk aversion engendered by procedure-based reporting among physicians that garners greater attention. State-based public reporting efforts could begin by reporting procedural outcomes and the outcomes of patients potentially eligible for procedures on the basis of admission diagnosis such as myocardial infarction. In fact, the initial phases of public reporting in Pennsylvania focused on AMI inpatient episodes of care rather than PCI procedures. 76 Second, because the care of outpatients is often divided among manifold providers, initial targets should focus on public reporting of outcomes of discrete office visits such as blood pressure control and appropriate antilipid therapy. These incremental steps away from procedural outcomes reporting could eventually lead to population registries that track the health status and outcomes of patients over time.
We also recognize that holding provider groups accountable for populations is challenging because patients receive care at different institutions and within different networks, but the emergence of accountable care organizations offers opportunities to match providers to large populations. In particular, patients could be attributed to provider networks where they have established primary care. 77 This would miss about one fifth to one quarter of care that occurs outside a patient's primary network. 78 Nevertheless, the proportion of out-ofnetwork care could be used as a variable in risk adjustment. In addition, attributing patients to their primary network in public reporting provides incentives for provider organizations to improve patient satisfaction and quality of care within their own networks so that patients are less likely to seek care elsewhere. For public reporting related to inpatient episodes of care such as AMI and CHF admissions, providers could be accountable for outcomes for a defined period of time after hospital discharge.
Identify Better Outcome Measures to Assess Quality
Second, although mortality is a convenient metric, it is not necessarily an accurate or appropriate measure of the quality of cardiac care. Mortality is typically low, and differences in mortality rates have poor discrimination between provider groups. For example, the 30-day mortality rate after PCI for stable patients is 1.4%, and the mortality rate after PCI for patients with ST-segment-elevation myocardial infarction or shock is 9.2%. 79 The same absolute number of random events, unrelated to quality, affects the relative proportion of the smaller number more. Therefore, random events are more likely to distort mortality rates for stable patients than for ST-segment-elevation myocardial infarction/shock patients. For elective PCI in stable patients, measurements of angina status after the procedure or rates of target lesion revascularization may be more meaningful quality metrics. Angina measurements are patient-reported outcomes, and these metrics should emphasize health conditions important to patients. Because mortality after elective PCI occurs rarely, mortality rates are more effective as a safety metric-those for which a hospital should rarely be identified as an outlier-than a quality metric. For certain high-risk patients for whom PCI is the only hope of survival, providers should not be discouraged from performing the procedure because of a high probability of mortality even with PCI. We support the exclusion of extremely high-risk patients from public reporting, consistent with the American Heart Association's recommendation to exclude patients with out-of-hospital cardiac arrest in PCI mortality reporting. 49 Even despite these types of exclusions, because mortality public reporting may shift procedures from high-risk patients to low-risk patients who may be less likely to benefit from procedures, procedural public reporting should include measures of appropriateness. Including appropriateness in public reporting for procedures not only safeguards against overuse in low-risk patients but also provides the public information about providers' focus on value for patients.
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Focus on Smaller Registries Rather Than Larger Databases of Billing Data
Third, because data from clinical registries are more accurate than data from administrative sources, they should constitute the basis of public reporting whenever possible. Cardiologists and cardiac surgeons are well positioned to access these resources. The American College of Cardiology issued the first national report of the NCDR (National Cardiovascular Data Registry) on PCI in 1996. 80 The NCDR has since expanded to incorporate other registries, including carotid artery stenting and carotid endarterectomy, diagnostic cardiac catheterization, implantable cardioverter-defibrillator placements, peripheral vascular intervention, and transcatheter valve replacement. Significantly, NCDR registries now include non-procedurebased registries. In particular, the ACTION-Get With The Guidelines registry tracks patients with AMI regardless of whether a procedure is performed. 81 The Practice Innovation and Clinical Excellence (PINNACLE) registry records data on outpatient visits. 82 These clinical registries could form the basis of a shift toward nonprocedural, clinical registries that capture data for all patients. Challenges certainly remain. For example, PINNACLE registry data are generated by outpatient visits and are not linked to patient outcomes. Regions, states, or integrated health systems could establish local clinical registries with sampling-based data adjudication systems, including outpatients and linking to data with patient outcomes. This type of registry has successfully been implemented in Massachusetts. 83 
Iteration Through Stakeholder Engagement
Finally, any public reporting must continually evolve with ongoing feedback from both clinicians and patients. Throughout the history of public reporting, newly recognized risk factors that can lead to treatment selection bias if not accounted for have emerged, including hospital-to-hospital transfers, 84, 85 designation of surgical inoperability, 28, 29 and extreme-risk patient characteristics such as ongoing cardiopulmonary resuscitation, neurological coma, and cardiogenic shock requiring circulatory support. 86 Risk-adjustment models will not account for all unaccounted factors that may differentiate providers from one another. 87 Because models cannot fully adjust for these factors and many factors may remain unrecognized, the validity of these models can improve with ongoing feedback from providers.
Perhaps most important, patients should play an essential role in iterative improvement of public reporting. Because patients do not use public reporting substantially in choosing providers, engaging patients may enhance the relevance and impact of public reporting. Feedback from patients about the relevance of particular metrics and methods of data presentation both could unleash greater use and impact of public reporting. Therefore, ongoing patient feedback will be indispensible.
Conclusions
Fundamentally, it is imperative that our generation of cardiologists and cardiac surgeons holds itself accountable to the public for the outcomes we produce. During the early phase of public reporting both genuine quality improvements and unintended consequences have occurred, but the availability of good data sources is improving, risk modeling is growing more sophisticated, and we are approaching the potential to report riskadjusted aggregate data about health status across populations rather than for specific procedures alone. Although the shortcomings of public reporting are well documented, we do not believe that this should cause providers and regulators to return to an era that Dr Codman bemoaned, an era in which providers had no obligation to measure and report outcomes.
Much work is ahead. Reports need to be consolidated into clearer and more parsimonious ratings that are meaningful to patients. That being said, simply creating composite metrics in star systems may oversimplify complex data and inadequately discriminate between hospitals. The proliferation of reporting requirements adds to administrative burden and does not present outcomes clearly to patients and payers. We need to develop better ways of associating patients and providers so that providers can be measured on maintaining and improving health status over time rather than just for discrete outcomes after specific procedures. We also need to better understand how to integrate the value of discordant metrics. For example, whether a hospital with better statin prescription rates is better than a hospital with higher rates of cardiac rehabilitation referral is unclear. Ultimately, the research community needs to produce better risk models that incorporate meaningful measures of health status and account for risk factors not traditionally included in risk models. This will build confidence in public reporting for both providers and consumers of that information.
We face a unique moment in public reporting, especially for cardiac care. The potential for public reporting to galvanize improvements in quality and cost persists. External pressure for transparency will not diminish, nor should it. All of these factors place cardiac providers on a unique precipice; how we reform public reporting will likely define public reporting for other providers. The promise of improved care, more transparency, and the urgency of patient and payer demand for public reporting behoove us to improve public reporting, not abandon it. As Dr Codman learned nearly a century ago, adopting outcome measurement is challenging. However, that challenge is still worth pursuing.
